Optimal Treatment of an SIS Disease with Two Strains by Telalagic,  Selma
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Optimal Treatment of an SIS Disease with Two Strains 
 
 
Selma Telalagic 
 
May 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
CWPE 1229 
 
 
 
Optimal Treatment of an SIS Disease
with Two Strains
Selma Telalagic
May 29, 2012
Abstract
This paper explores optimal treatment of an SIS (Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible)
disease that has two strains with di¤erent infectivities. When we assume that neither
eradication nor full infection are possible, it is shown that there are two categories of
equilibria. First, there are two continua of interior equilibria characterised by a xed,
positive total level of infection, where both strands of the disease prevail. It is hypoth-
esised that a Skiba curve of indi¤erence lies between them. Second, there are two sets
of equilibria where one strand of the disease is eradicated asymptotically. The feasibil-
ity of equilibria depends on parameter assumptions; a combination of low natural rate
of recovery and large di¤erence between infectivities leaves only a small proportion of
equilibria as feasible. Simulations exploring the relationship between cost and optimal
policy are carried out. There exists a parameter range such that, counter-intuitively, it is
optimal to allow the high-infectivity strain of the disease to prevail, while asymptotically
eradicating the low-infectivity strain. Within this parameter range, there is added benet
from policy exibility. At higher costs, simulations of the interior equilibria demonstrate
the existence of a Skiba curve. The curve delineates two regions, each of which has a
clear optimal policy.
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1 Introduction
Epidemiology, as it is studied today, originated in the early 20th century and has since
developed into a multi-faceted eld that combines the skills of mathematicians, biologists and,
most recently, economists. One predominant area of epidemiology focuses on transmission
system models. These models are built on di¤erential equations that describe the evolution
of disease prevalence over time as a function of parameters. Often a point of criticism, these
models assume homogeneous mixing within populations, identical agents and no behavioural
adaptation. Although this produces the benet of parsimony, allowing signicant predictive
power and the ability to work with data, there is a strand of the literature that argues this
simplicity comes at the price of applicability (Epstein 2009). Nevertheless, few advances have
been made in other approaches to epidemiology that have received the backing that these
types of models have.
In the standard Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) model, individuals move between
two states, susceptible and infected, based on exogenous probabilities. The probability of an
individual catching a disease when he encounters an infected person depends on an infectivity
or transmission parameter. This parameter is predominantly assumed to be homogeneous,
a simplication that does not allow for policy di¤erentiation if there exist several strands of
infection. Infections in reality are frequently present in more than one form. To motivate an
infection stratied by transmission parameter, consider the case of HIV as an example. HIV
has two main strains: HIV-1 and HIV-2. Studies show that the less common HIV-2 strain is
also less infectious than its counterpart for most of its infectious period.1 This motivates us
to ask how a policymaker deals with the presence of several variants of an infection in the
population that vary by transmission risk. There is a trade-o¤ between treating individuals,
which is costly but o¤ers a welfare benet, and saving money. There is a further trade-o¤
between treating individuals infected with the more infectious versus less infectious strand.
Supposing the policymaker can di¤erentiate policy by infection type, does she treat the more
infectious or less infectious rst? What is the prevalence of the di¤erent infection strands in
equilibrium?
Variations on standard epidemiological models are common in the mathematical liter-
ature, where researchers detail dynamics and equilibria but do not look at optimality and
intervention. In direct relevance to this paper, Castillo-Chavez, Huang and Li (1999) develop
an SIS model with a two-strand disease where individuals are genetically predisposed to a
specic strand. They derive stability conditions on the various equilibria of the model, which
include boundary (one or both strands eradicated) and coexistence (both strands prevail)
equilibria. These are equilibria the system tends towards when there is no intervention. Hy-
man and Li (1997) analyse an SIS STD model with multiple groups where interaction between
1More information on this can be found at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/basic) as well as the charity AVERT (http://www.avert.org/hiv-types.htm).
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groups is behaviourally variable and depends on prevalence levels in the di¤erent groups. The
development of the infection is complex and depends on how these interactions take place;
individuals may reduce their contacts with individuals in high prevalence groups, which may
reduce overall prevalence. Biological epidemiology brings models to the data. Truscott et al
(2011) show that accurate modelling of inuenza should not neglect the presence of several
strains; they construct a model with two strains and show that its predictions are close to
data on inuenza. This paper develops a model with multiple strains akin to those studied by
mathematical and biological epidemiologists while simultaneously introducing the economic
consideration of optimal intervention.
Economic research into epidemiology is fast-growing. Research has focused on two main
areas relevant to the present paper: optimal intervention and empirical work. Optimal inter-
vention has been studied in several extensions to the standard model, including the consider-
ation of spatial factors, budget constraints and the availability of several policy instruments.
Rowthorn, Laxminarayan and Gilligan (2009) focus on the spatial dynamics of disease. They
answer the question of optimal control of infections via treatment in the case of metapopula-
tions, dened as subpopulations within a population that mix at a lower rate than individuals
within each subpopulation. Although intuition may suggest that equalising infection rates
across subpopulations leads to the highest level of welfare, this turns out to be the worst
possible solution. Another policy-relevant aspect is the role of budget constraints. Rowthorn
(2004) examines this in the context of optimal control of a disease using treatment and shows
that funds should never be retained as long as there are individuals that can be treated.
Rowthorn and Toxvaerd (2011) examine analytically the trade-o¤ between vaccination and
treatment as two instruments available to the policy-maker. Gersovitz and Hammer (2004)
provide a fruitful discussion of this issue of targeting when these two policy instruments are
available. In particular, they argue that while naturally one would assume only infected peo-
ple are treated and susceptible people are vaccinated, there may be other targeting functions,
especially if the policymaker is unable to perfectly observe infection levels in the population.
Signicant empirical work has been carried out on infectious disease. Several studies
have been carried out aiming to verify the responsiveness of risky behaviour to changes in
perceived risk of contracting infections such as HIV/AIDS. St. Lawrence et al (1991) look
at di¤erences in risky behaviour across two cities with di¤erent prevalence rates. They nd
startling di¤erences with risky behaviour being as much as three times more common in the
low-prevalence city as compared to the high-prevalence city. Similarly, Dupas (2005) looks
at whether a public health information program that teaches teenagers about relative risks
of contracting HIV/AIDS depending on partner age group has an e¤ect on their behaviour.
Dupas nds that the information campaign reduces childbearing by 1.7% in the treatment
group, representing a 31% decrease in childbearing. In terms of age group, there is a reduction
in cross-generational pregnancies of 65%.
Oster (2005) provides a detailed simulation-based analysis on the e¤ects of changes in
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transmission rates and partner choice on national HIV/AIDS prevalence levels. Using actual
transmission rates and sexual behaviour parameters, the paper predicts an HIV/AIDS infec-
tion prevalence of 0.23% in the United States and 12.7% in Africa, close to actual prevalence
rates of 0.15% and 11.9%. Estimates are then carried out using US sexual behaviour parame-
ters but Sub-Saharan African transmission rates. This results in an estimated prevalence rate
of over 11% for the United States, suggesting that it is the transmission rate that is driving the
higher HIV/AIDS prevalence rates observed in Africa when compared to the United States.
This shows that the transmission rate is an important determinant of prevalence levels.
The present paper is a natural next step for the literature. While the case of several policy
instruments has been considered in the theoretical literature, it has not been considered in
conjunction with more than one infection type, a scenario that brings this type of modelling
closer to the realities faced by policymakers. Further, the empirical literature highlights the
importance of modelling transmission parameters correctly. This paper explores an SIS model
with two infection strains and provides answers on optimal policy in various situations. We
show that the model has two categories of steady state. First, there are two continua of
steady states where both infection strains prevail. Second, there are asymptotic equilibria
where one of the strains is eliminated asymptotically, while the other is endemic. Under
certain parameter assumptions, it is optimal to asymptotically eliminate the less infectious
strand while allowing the high infectivity strand to prevail. This interesting case is explored by
way of simulations, where optimality under xed policy and variable policy is explored. The
role of cost of treatment in governing optimal policy is explored in detail. We also examine
the interior equilibria where both infection strains prevail and demonstrate the existence of
a Skiba curve of indi¤erence between them.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model and
Section 3 develops the model to encompass two infection types. Section 4 provides examples
of simulations. Section 5 concludes.
2 The basic SIS model
2.1 Overview
The results of the basic SIS model with treatment are discussed in this section, following
Rowthorn (2004) and Goldman and Lightwood (2002). It has become standard to assume
random mixing in models of this type. Typically, these models also assume a homogeneous
transmission parameter. This assumption does not provide an accurate representation of the
way disease spreads when it exists in di¤erent forms. Indeed, awareness of the improved
predictions resulting from accurate transmission parameters has been raised by Oster (2005).
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These observations provide the impetus for an extension to the basic SIS model, which is
presented in Section 4.
The standard SIS model is in continuous time. There are two possible states: individuals
are susceptible (proportion S of the total population) or infected (proportion I). They can
move between the two states an unlimited number of times. Agents are homogeneous and
the population is closed. Perfect or homogeneous mixing is assumed between agents, with a
uniform transmission probability (). A proportion f of infected individuals is treated, with
the success rate of treatment (which can be interpreted as a rate of recovery) given by the
parameter . There is also the possibility of spontaneous or natural recovery at rate  . The
evolution of the two subpopulations, susceptible and infected, is described by the following
di¤erential equations:
_I(t) = I(t)S(t)   I(t)(f(t)+ ); (1)
_S(t) = I(t)(f(t)+ )  I(t)S(t): (2)
Optimal policy is derived via the introduction of an objective function. Typically inter-
vention takes the form of either vaccination or treatment. The latter is studied in the present
paper. Intervention a¤ects welfare consequences directly by inuencing the rate of movement
between the susceptible and infected subpopulations.
Objective functions can take many forms, from a social planners welfare maximisation
function, to an individuals utility maximisation function. There is also the possibility of
cost minimisation, prevalence minimisation, and so on and so forth. One natural objective
function to add to this model is social welfare, determined by the proportion of infected and
susceptible individuals and the expenditure on treatment:
W (I0) =
Z 1
0
e t(pN(1  I(t))  cf(t)I(t))dt: (3)
In this simple case, infected individuals have a value of zero while susceptible individuals
have a value of p; treatment has a constant marginal cost of c per instant per individual.
The problem is solved as a Hamiltonian optimal control problem, normalising population to
1: S(t) + I(t) = N = 1 for all t. This allows (1) and (2) to collapse to one constraint.
It is assumed that
f 2 [0; 1]
I(0) = I0 > 0 given
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The current value Hamiltonian function is
H = p(1  I)  cfI + I((1  I)   f  ) (4)
where  is the shadow price of infection. Di¤erentiating the Hamiltonian with respect to
the control variable gives us the solution, which is of "bang-bang" form:
f
8><>:
= 0
2 (0; 1)
= 1
9>=>; if 
8><>:
>
=
<
9>=>;  c: (5)
Policy can either be at an interior level f 2 (0; 1), or at a boundary level, f = 0 or
1. The interpretation is as follows. The multiplier is the shadow price of another infected
individual. It will always be negative. The higher is this shadow price in absolute terms, the
more costly it is to social welfare to have an additional infected person. On the other hand,
c
 is the relative price of treating an infected individual - it is the ratio of cost to treatment
e¤ectiveness. The negative of this price of treatment is the welfare cost from treating an
additional individual. These concepts clarify the intuition behind the solution; it is clear
that if the cost of infection exceeds the cost of treatment, everyone is treated. Similarly,
when the cost of treatment is higher than the cost of infection, no one is treated. When they
are equal, any interior level of treatment is optimal subject to parameters.
Note that the equation of motion for the multiplier is
_ =    @H
@I
= p+ cf   ((1  2I)   f     ): (6)
Let us examine the cases of interior and boundary policies more closely.
2.2 Policy is interior
For an interior policy to be optimal, the Hamiltionian conditions require that  =   c .
Di¤erentiating this gives us _(t) = 0. Further, it must be that _I(t) = 0 if we are in steady
state. These three conditions give us steady state solutions I = I;  =  and f = f:
I =
p+ c(      )
2c
; (7)
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f =
c( +    )  p
2c
; (8)
 =   c

: (9)
Thus, a path with interior policy has I = I;  =  and f = f. Note that f may lie
outside the range (0; 1), in which case no feasible interior policy exists.
2.3 Policy is at a boundary
There are two feasible boundary policies that can be optimal in steady state: f = 0 or f = 1.
Consider the case where  >   c . Under this policy it must be that f = f = 0. Solving
_I(t) = 0 yields
I = 1  

: (10)
The disease is endemic as long as  < . It is eradicated if  > . Setting _(t) = 0 yields
 =
p
       : (11)
Another possibility is that  >   c . In this case, f = f = 1. Solving _I(t) = 0 and
_(t) = 0 yields
I = 1  + 

;
 =
p+ c
+        :
The disease is endemic as long as +  < . It is eradicated if +  > .
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2.4 Optimal policy
Policy can be either at one of the boundaries or at an interior level, depending on the value of
the shadow price. Rowthorn (2004) and Goldman and Lightwood (2002) show that optimal
policy will take on one of the two boundary values. It is never optimal to treat partially.
This is because the shadow price is a single-valued function of the state variable, so optimal
policy can have at most one switch point. The interior steady state can only be reached by
a path that zig-zags back on itself. In contrast, each of the boundary steady states can be
reached by a path with at most one switch point, with the precise path depending on the
initial infection level. Which policy of the two boundaries is optimal will depend on the value
of parameters.
3 The SIS model with two strains of infection
3.1 Overview
In the model of the previous section, the transmission rate is uniform and there is one policy
instrument. In this section we relax both of these assumptions. Suppose there are two
variants of infection, one more infectious than the other. The more infectious variant H
has transmission rate H while the less infectious variant L is characterised by transmission
rate L. The policymaker has two policy instruments at her disposal (fH and fL), each
targeting one of the infection strands. There is an implicit assumption that the policymaker
can distinguish the two strains and therefore target therapy perfectly. This we can relate
to the discussion of Gersovitz and Hammer (2004). We assume that the policymaker has
perfect information about each strain of the disease and its prevalence in the population.
Other versions are possible of course; for example, a policymaker may know an individual is
ill but not which strain of the disease he has. In this case the policymaker would e¤ectively
have only one policy instrument at hand.
A further assumption of the model is that individuals can catch either infection strand at
the outset. When infected they transmit the strand that they themselves are infected with.
Super-infection is not possible: individuals cannot become infected with both strains of the
infection at the same time. Similar to the previous section, there is a possibility of exogenous
recovery. If individuals recover, they are again susceptible to either infection strain. The
proportion of the total population infected with H is IH . The proportion infected with L
is IL. The total population is normalised to size 1: IH + IL + S = 1. The policymaker
maximises the social welfare function
V (I0H ; I
0
L) =
Z 1
0
e t(p(1  IH(t)  IL(t))  c(fH(t)IH(t) + fL(t)IL(t)))dt (12)
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subject to the equations of motion for the two infection types:
_IH = HIH(t)(1  IH(t)  IL(t))  IH(t)( + fH(t)); (13)
_IL = LIL(t)(1  IH(t)  IL(t))  IL(t)( + fL(t)): (14)
All parameters are strictly positive. Further,
fH ; fL 2 [0; 1]
IH(0) = I
0
H > 0 given
IL(0) = I
0
L > 0 given
I0H + I
0
L < 1
In addition,
H > L >  + : (15)
The inequalities in (15) ensure that neither variant of the disease can be eliminated even
asymptotically by treating all infected people. Thus, at any steady state, IH ; IL > 0: They
also ensure that IH(t) + IL(t) < 1 for all t:
The current value Hamiltonian is
H = p(1  IH   IL)  c(fHIH + fLIL)
+H(HIH(1  IH   IL)  IH( + fH)
+L(LIL(1  IH   IL)  IL( + fL) (16)
The rst order-conditions yield the following solution:
fH
8><>:
= 0
2 (0; 1)
= 1
9>=>; if H
8><>:
>
=
<
9>=>;  c; (17)
fL
8><>:
= 0
2 (0; 1)
= 1
9>=>; if L
8><>:
>
=
<
9>=>;  c: (18)
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The equations of motion for the two costate variables are
_H = H   @H
@IH
= p+ cfH   H (  + H(1  IH   IL)     fH)
+(HHIH + LLIL); (19)
_L = L   @H
@IL
= p+ cfL   L (  + L(1  IH   IL)     fL)
+(HHIH + LLIL): (20)
In the next section we derive the equilibria of this model.
3.2 Fixed points
3.2.1 The set of feasible xed points
We are interested in the xed points or steady states of the system. The reason we are inter-
ested in xed points is because they are the states the system converges to. This convergence
takes place only in the limit in the special case of the Asymptotic Fixed Points (AFPs), which
will be dened shortly.
We assume that there are no cycles: the system always converges to one of our potential
xed points or AFPs. A proof of the non-existence of cycles is beyond the scope of this paper.
Let us examine the xed points in more detail.
Denition 1 A xed point (FP) is a solution (fH ; f

L; I

H ; I

L; 

H ; 

L) satisfying equations
(13), (14), (17), (18), (19) and (20) as well as _IH = _IL = _H = _L = _fH = _fL = 0.
There are nine potential xed points, listed below. The notation Aab denotes the xed
point with policy fH = a; f

L = b for a; b = 0 or 1. The notation a; b = 2 denotes an interior
policy.
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A00 : fH = 0; fL = 0
A01 : fH = 0; fL = 1
A02 : fH = 0; fL 2 (0; 1)
A10 : fH = 1; fL = 0
A11 : fH = 1; fL = 1
A12 : fH = 1; fL 2 (0; 1)
A20 : fH 2 (0; 1); fL = 0
A21 : fH 2 (0; 1); fL = 1
A22 : fH 2 (0; 1); fL 2 (0; 1)
Denition 2 An asymptotic xed point (AFP) is a solution (fH ; f

L; I

H ; I

L; 

H ; 

L) where
at least one component in each of the pairs (IH ; IL); (H ; L) comes arbitrarily close to its
solution but only converges to it in the limit. At least one equality in each of the following
pairs does not hold: f _IH = 0; _IL = 0g; f _H = 0; _L = 0g: The condition _fH = _fL = 0 holds.
We refer to AFPs and FPs jointly as equilibria. The key di¤erence between AFPs and
FPs is that some variables at an AFP are not constant. They move towards a constant but
only reach it in the limit. There are two potential types of AFPs, each encompassing several
potentially optimal policies. They are listed below:
A13 : IH ! 0; IL = IL; fH = 1; fL = fL 2 [0; 1]
A31 : IL ! 0; IH = IH ; fL = 1; fH = fH 2 [0; 1]
Overall this gives us a large set of potential equilibria. Let us reduce this set by showing
the infeasibility of certain xed points.
Lemma 3 All xed points are of type A10; A12; or A20.
Proof. Consider A22. Suppose fH 2 (0; 1) and fL 2 (0; 1) during a nite interval of time.
Then H = L =   c and thus _H = _L = 0 within this interval. Subtracting (20) from (19)
yields:
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c
(H   L)(1  IL   IH) = 0
This is not possible since the left hand side is strictly positive. This demonstrates that
A22 does not satisfy the Hamiltonian conditions and is not feasible. Thus, the Hamiltonian
conditions imply that at least one of the control variables at a steady state is on the boundary.
Since IH ; IL > 0, we can rewrite the equations of motion as follows:
_IH
IH
= H(1  IH   IL)     fH (21)
_IL
IL
= L(1  IH   IL)     fL (22)
At a xed point the right hand sides of the above equations must be zero. This implies
that
fH =
H(1  IH   IL)  

; (23)
fL =
L(1  IH   IL)  

: (24)
Subtracting (24) from (23) yields
fH   fL = (H   L)(1  IH   IL)

> 0: (25)
This is not satised by xed points A00; A01; A11; A02 and A21. This reduces the set of
feasible FPs to F = fA10; A12; A20g.
3.2.2 Characteristics of xed points A10 and A12
Fixed points A10 and A12 are the case when fH = 1 and f

L = 1 in the former while f

L 2 (0; 1)
in the latter. By setting _IH = 0; _IL = 0 and fH = 1 we obtain the treatment levels that
characterise these xed points. Except in the special case of strict equality of 1  (H L)H
+
 ;
the xed point is type A12: The xed point A10 is a boundary xed point and will be addressed
in Section 4.2.5. It can be shown that there is a line of xed points in (IH ; IL) space of type
A12 that satises the Hamiltonian conditions with the following properties (derivations can
be found in the Appendix):
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IH + I

L = 1 
 + 
H
H =  
c


1 +
(H   L)
H
 + 


<   c

L =  
c

fH = 1
fL = 1 
(H   L)
H
 + 

3.2.3 Characteristics of xed point A20
Fixed point A20 is the case when fH 2 (0; 1) and fL = 0. At xed point A20, setting fL = 0,
_IH = 0 and _IL = 0 yields the optimal treatment levels. Except in the special case of strict
equality of 1  (H L)L

 , the xed point is of type A20. In the case of strict equality, this
xed point becomes A10. It can be shown that there is a line of xed points of type A20 that
satisfy the Hamiltonian conditions with the following properties:
IH + I

L = 1 

L
H =  
c

L =  
c


1  (H   L)
L



>   c

fH =
(H   L)
L


fL = 0
Derivations of this can be found in the Appendix. Let us label xed points A12 and A20
as Interior Fixed Points (IFPs) for ease of exposition, as they are xed points that induce one
policy instrument to be at an interior level. It is interesting to notice the similarity between
the xed points when policies are at boundary levels in the two-strain and one-strain cases.
Setting policy to (1; 1) or (0; 0) in A12 or A20 gives us prevalence levels that look similar to
what we observed when we had one strain. They di¤er in the constants due to the fact that
the transmission parameter in the two-type case is not homogeneous; rather, it is a weighted
average depending on the prevalence of each strain in the population.
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3.2.4 Characteristics of asymptotic xed points
For the analysis of asymptotic xed points we need to dene the concept of a Most Rapid
Approach Path (MRAP).
Denition 4 An MRAP is a path with a policy that ensures convergence to the xed point
in less time than any other policy.
First, consider A13. IH tends asymptotically towards zero and IL converges to some
equilibrium level:
A13 : IH  ! 0; IL = IL
For IH to asymptotically tend to zero, we require
_IH
IH
< 0 at all points in time, for which
the MRAP is fH = 1. Combining these features gives
_IH
IH
= H(1   IH   IL)       
H(1   IL)       , for IH su¢ ciently close to zero. This needs to be negative, so the
condition required for this to be a feasible AFP is
1  + 
H
< IL: (26)
Similarly, IL converges to IL, which requires
_IL
IL
= 0: Using this we can solve for IL:
IL = 1 
 + fL
L
: (27)
Thus, (26) simplies to
 + fL
L
<
+ 
H
: (28)
Any fL chosen to satisfy this will cause IH to converge asymptotically to zero and IL to
IL as dened above. Thus there exists a xed point of type A13, which involves asymptotic
convergence of IH to zero:
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IH  ! 0
IL = 1 
 + fL
L
fH = 1
Similarly, consider xed point A31, where IL tends towards zero asymptotically and IH
converges to IH :
A31 : IH = I

H ; IL  ! 0
For IL to tend asymptotically to zero, we require
_IL
IL
< 0 at all points in time, for which
the MRAP is fL = 1. Combining these features gives
_IL
IL
= L(1   IH   IL)       
L(1  IH)    , for IL su¢ ciently close to zero. This needs to be negative, which requires
1  + 
L
< IH : (29)
Similarly, IH converges to IH , which requires
_IH
IH
= 0: Using this we can solve for IH :
IH = 1 
 + fH
H
: (30)
Thus, (29) simplies to
 + fH
H
<
+ 
L
: (31)
Any fH chosen to satisfy this will cause IL to converge asymptotically to zero and IH to
IH as dened above. Thus, there exists a xed point of type A31, which involves asymptotic
convergence of IL to zero:
IL  ! 0
IH = 1 
 + fH
H
fL = 1
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Note that both asymptotic xed points can be feasible at the same time. Rearranging
(28) and (31) gives:
(
1
L
  1
H
) <

H
  f

L
L
;
(
1
L
  1
H
) >
fH
H
  
L
:
Both conditions can be satised as long as fH ; f

L < 1. The case of fH = fL = 1 deserves
further attention and is examined more fully in Section 4.2.6. Although both asymptotic
xed points can be feasible at the same time, asymptotic eradication of both strains of the
disease is never possible:
Proposition 5 Both variants of the disease cannot be simultaneously eradicated even as-
ymptotically in equilibrium, i.e. we cannot have both IH ! 0 and IL ! 0, if we assume that
 + 
H
< 1;

L
< 1;
 + 
L
< 1:
Proof. In the Appendix.
This Proposition shows that in the case of the AFPs, one strain of the disease always
prevails. This becomes important when it is shown in a later section that under some pa-
rameter constellations, the only feasible xed points are of the asymptotic type and thus in
these cases asymptotic eradication of both strains of the disease is not possible.
3.2.5 Regimes of feasibility: xed points
Following Wagener (2003), the parameter space can be split into di¤erent regimes which
mandate which xed points are feasible under every possible parameter constellation. Dene
the constant K as
K =
H   L
L
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The parameter space can now be divided into three regimes of feasibility.
Proposition 6 If K < 1, there exist a line of xed points of type A12 and a line of xed
points of type A20. If K = 1, there exists a xed point of type A10. If K > 1, there are no
ordinary xed points.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The proof of this Proposition shows that if K < 1, there are two lines of xed points with
total infection levels:
IH + I

L = 1 
 + 
H
;
IH + I

L = 1 

L
:
Subtracting,
(IH + I

L )  (IH + IL) =

H

1  (H   L)
L



> 0
This shows that A20 always has higher total infection than A12. This is obvious as in the
latter, both treatment levels are higher.
3.2.6 Regimes of feasibility: asymptotic xed points
We examine further the role of K in the feasibility of the AFPs. Let us denote A013 as the
AFP A13 when fH = 1 and f

L = 0. Further denote the AFP A13 when f

H = 1 and f

L = 1 as
A113. Last, A
i
13 is the AFP A13 when f

H = 1 and f

L 2 (0; 1). Symmetrically, we can dene
A031, A
i
31 and A
1
31 as the AFP A31 when f

H = 0; f

H 2 (0; 1) and fH = 1 respectively and
fL = 1 in all cases.
Proposition 7 If K < 1, there exist AFPs of type A031, A
i
31, A
1
31, A
0
13 and A
i
13. If K  1,
there exist AFPs of type A031, A
i
31, and A
1
31.
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Figure 1: The set of feasible equilibria when K > 1.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The set of feasible equilibria when K > 1 is depicted in Figure 1. The feasible set when
K = 1 is shown in Figure 2. Figure 3. shows the set of feasible equilibria when K < 1. The
AFPs with interior policies are not depicted in these graphs as they are only pinned down
once the treatment levels are known.
3.2.7 Feasible policy along the path
It is necessary to consider the path towards each of the steady states, and in particular which
policies are feasible under which conditions. Policies along the path will always be boundary
policies, as these are Most Rapid Approach Paths (MRAPs). We take each of the boundary
policies in turn and examine the feasibility conditions required for IH and IL to converge to
their steady state values. Details of this are provided in the Appendix. Letting Pab denote
the policy fH = a, fL = b, the conditions for feasibility are summarised in the table below:
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Figure 2: The set of feasible equilibria when K = 1.
Figure 3: The set of feasible equilibria when K < 1.
19
Figure 4: Feasible policies depicted for the case when K < 1.
Table 1 (Feasible policies along the path)
_IH ; _IL > 0 _IH ; _IL < 0
P00 1  L > IH + IL 1 

H
< IH + IL
P10 1  L > IH + IL 1 
+
H
< IH + IL
P11 1  +L > IH + IL 1 
+
H
< IH + IL
P01 1  +L > IH + IL 1 

H
< IH + IL
Figure 4 shows which policies are feasible in di¤erent regions of initial infection levels.
3.3 Optimal policy
3.3.1 Optimal policy in the neighbourhood of the IFPs
Having derived feasibility conditions for the various policies, the obvious question is which
policies are optimal. We explore the behaviour of the path in approaching each of the interior
xed points. Specically, what is the policy along the path near to the xed point? We know
that policies along the path will be at a boundary as these are MRAPs. Therefore, we
examine those policies that are at an interior level at the steady state, as they are likely to
have a switch point along the path. The approach is to perturb the xed point slightly and
derive the policy in the neighbourhood of the xed point.
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Proposition 8 The optimal policy when approaching A12 from above is fL = 1. The optimal
policy when approaching this xed point from below is fL = 0. The optimal value of f

H is
equal to its steady state value, fH = 1, throughout. For xed point A20, the optimal policy
when approaching from above is fH = 1 and f

H = 0 when approaching from below. The
optimal value of fL is at its steady state value, f

L = 0.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Comparing these optimal policies to the feasibility conditions of the previous section, we
nd that all of the optimal policies are feasible. From the conditions derived for policy along
the path, it is clear that, for example, the upper line IH + I

L = 1   L is attainable from
the top using both P11 and P10. It is also clear that P11 is the MRAP. However, we nd that
P10 is the optimal policy. The intuition for this is as follows. This is because if fL = 0 at the
xed point, then L >   c . Since L is continuous it must be that L >   c in the vicinity
of the xed point. Hence fL = 0 in the vicinity of the xed point and it cannot be optimal
to reach this xed point with P11. Similar intuition applies for the optimal policy for A12.
3.3.2 Skiba Hypothesis
Denition 9 A Skiba point is a point of indi¤erence where two separate solutions for the
optimal control problem exist (Wagener 2003).
We hypothesise the existence of a Skiba curve along which conditions prescribe indi¤erence
between selecting the path towards A20 versus A12. Note that these paths are the optimal
paths derived in the previous section. Following on from these results, the hypothesis is that
there is a Skiba curve lying between the two lines of xed points. If the initial point
 
I0H ; I
0
L

lies between the origin and the Skiba curve, then optimal policy is
fH = 1; fL = 0 for I0H + I
0
L < 1 
 + 
H
fH = 1; fL = 1 for I0H + I
0
L > 1 
 + 
H
fH = 1; fL = 1  (H   L)
H
 + 

for I0H + I
0
L = 1 
 + 
H
If the initial point
 
I0H ; I
0
L

lies on the opposite side of the Skiba curve from the origin,
then optimal policy is
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Figure 5: Optimal policies and the Skiba curve.
fH = 0; fL = 0 for I0H + I
0
L < 1 

L
fH = 1; fL = 0 for I0H + I
0
L > 1 

L
fH =
(H   L)
L


; fL = 0 for I0H + I
0
L = 1 

L
Note that all these optimal policies satisfy the feasibility conditions set out in Table 1. The
sets of optimal policies are depicted in Figure 5. Skiba curves cannot be derived analytically.
Their presence can only be detected by means of simulations.
3.3.3 Optimal policy in the neighbourhood of the AFPs
We have already shown that optimal policy for A31 will involve fL = 1 as this is the MRAP.
Similarly, optimal policy for A13 will involve fH = 1. The question is which policy is optimal
of the range available to fH in A31 and fL in A13. In order to draw conclusions on this we
observe that the asymptotic xed points always involve one strand of the infection that is
asymptotically eradicated. As a result, the behaviour of the system in the neighbourhood
of the xed point can be approximated by the behaviour of a one-infection system. This
is because the behaviour of the system for small IL is very similar to the behaviour when
IL = 0. Naturally this holds for IH close to zero as well.
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The behaviour of a one-infection system has been analysed in Section 3. As was discussed,
Rowthorn (2004) shows that only extreme values for policy are optimal. This is because a
one-infection system has a costate variable that is single-valued in the infection level along
the optimal path, which implies that the optimum path cannot be a spiral. In our case the
costate variable H is dened as
H =
@V (IH ; IL)
@IH
;
which for small IL is single-valued along the optimal path. Similarly,
L =
@V (IH ; IL)
@IL
;
which for small IH is single-valued along the optimal path. Interior policies involve spirals.
This implies that optimal policy for the AFPs will only ever involve boundary values, which
allows us to eliminate Ai31 and A
i
13 as steady states that are never optimal. Therefore, when
K > 1, the set of feasible equilibria is F = fA031; A131g, one of which will be optimal. When
K < 1, the set of feasible equilibria is F = fA12; A20; A031; A131; A013g, one of which will be
optimal. Similarly, when K = 1, the feasible set is F = fA10; A031; A131g. We cannot make
any further conclusions on the optimality of these remaining feasible xed points. Optimality
will depend on parameter values. This will be explored by way of simulations in the next
section.
4 Simulations
The purpose of simuations is to enable the identication of optimal policy under di¤erent
parameters. Examples are provided of optimal policy in the case of various parameter assump-
tions. Simulations are carried out using the fourth-order Runge-Kutta method. Recalling
the constant K = H LL

 , there are three cases that can be evaluated: K < 1, K = 1 and
K > 1. We separate these into two cases: the case when K > 1 and there are only two
feasible xed points: A031 and A
1
31, and the case when K  1 and the interior xed points are
feasible.
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4.1 Paths with xed policy
The case when K > 1 is interesting because it suggests that with an appropriate set of
parameters, it may be optimal to only eradicate the low infectivity strain, while allowing the
high infectivity strain to be endemic, with full or maybe even no treatment. Further, this
case will allow the clearest policy recommendations as the number of possible optimal policies
is small.
The following parameter assumptions ensure that K > 1:
Table 2 (Parameter values)
Parameter Value
H 0:95
L 0:4
 0:15
 0:2
In addition, we assume that p = 1 and  = 0:111. The goal is to evaluate whether, under
di¤erent scenarios, it is better to move towards A031 or A
1
31. In Section 4.2.4 it was shown
that in the neighbourhood of A031, optimal policy is (f

H ; f

L) = (0; 1). In the neighbourhood
of A131, optimal policy is (f

H ; f

L) = (1; 1). These policies may not be optimal along the
entire path towards these xed points. However, we begin with a simple thought experiment
where we assume that the policymaker can only choose one policy and cannot change it.
This may happen in reality, for example, if the policymaker commits to a certain treatment
level and purchases the requisite amount of material. Organising additional treatment may
take time. Further, there may be political factors as agencies responsible for treatment may
not be able to secure additional funds from governements in the short run. We carry out
simulations where we assume that this is the case. In the next section, we allow for exibility
of treatment across time. The simulations in this section are carried out with t = 90. We
can interpret each t as being one day, which implies that the results simulate an infection
evolving over approximately 90 days.
Optimal policy is evaluated based on the value of the integral, V , under each policy. We
x policy at the beginning and allow the system to converge to steady state. In order to
analyse policy under various scenarios, we focus on the cost paremeter c, which we vary. The
initial value for the L infection is constant across all simulations and is set at a value close
to zero: I0L = 0:1. We nd that there are three regions of values for c, each of which involve
a di¤erent optimal policy. These are shown in the table below:
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Table 3 (Regions of optimal policy as c varies when I0L = 0:1)
Region c fH f

L
I (low costs) c < 0:2875 1 1
II (intermediate costs) 0:2875  c  0:3006 0 or 1, depending on I0H 1
III (high costs) c > 0:3006 0 1
Let us look at examples from each region and compare the value of V when starting at
di¤erent initial points I0H and setting fH = 0 or fH = 1. Note that when we are at A
1
31,
IH = 1   +H = 0:6316. When we are at A
0
31, I

H = 1   H = 0:8421. We take ve initial
infection levels for the H type, distributed evenly across the interval I0H 2 [0:6316; 0:8421].
First, consider Region I. Let c = 0:1. The table below gives the prevalence of each
infection type when steady state is reached and the value of the integral of moving to that
steady state. The policy with the higher value of V - the optimal policy - is emphasised in
bold.
Table 4 ( c = 0:1)
fH = 1 (path towards A131) fH = 0 (path towards A
0
31)
I0H I

L I

H V I

L I

H V
0:6667 0:0000110 0:6316 2:3134 0:00000027 0:8421 1:3883
0:7018 0:0000109 0:6316 2:2641 0:00000026 0:8421 1:3425
0:7369 0:0000108 0:6316 2:2170 0:00000026 0:8421 1:2989
0:7719 0:0000107 0:6316 2:1720 0:00000026 0:8421 1:2572
0:8070 0:0000106 0:6316 2:1287 0:00000026 0:8421 1:2172
In this scenario, policy is independent of the initial value. It is always optimal to set
fH = 1 and treat everyone. As costs rise, we enter Region II. As an example of policy
evaluation for costs in this region, we set c = 0:295. The table below shows details of the
value of the integral and the infection levels for this parameter combination:
Table 5 ( c = 0:295)
fH = 1 (path towards A131) fH = 0 (path towards A
0
31)
I0H I

L I

H V I

L I

H V
0:6667 0:0000110 0:6316 1:4806 0:00000027 0:8421 1:4636
0:7018 0:0000109 0:6316 1:4223 0:00000026 0:8421 1:4184
0:7369 0:0000108 0:6316 1:3668 0:00000026 0:8421 1:3753
0:7719 0:0000107 0:6316 1:3138 0:00000026 0:8421 1:3342
0:8070 0:0000106 0:6316 1:2628 0:00000026 0:8421 1:2947
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From the simulations it is clear that for I0H  0:7018, the policy fH = 1 is optimal. For
I0H  0:7369, the policy fH = 0 is optimal. However, we can be more specic than this. In
the region I0H 2 (0:7018; 0:7369), there is a Skiba point as hypothesised, where the initial
value is such that policy is indi¤erent between setting fH = 0 and f

H = 1. Simulations show
that this value is ~I0H = 0:7125, where V = 1:4051 for both policies. Optimal policy when
c = 0:295 is summarised in the table below:
Table 6 (Optimal policy when c = 0:295)
I0H f

H f

L
I0H < 0:7125 1 1
I0H = 0:7125 (Skiba point) 0 or 1 1
I0H > 0:7125 0 1
The remaining region to be considered is Region III, where c > 0:3006 and optimal policy
is fH = 0. Let us take c = 0:5 as an example. The table below details the values of the
relevant variables from the simulations:
Table 7 ( c = 0:5)
fH = 1 (path towards A131) fH = 0 (path towards A
0
31)
I0H I

L I

H V I

L I

H V
0:6667 0:0000110 0:6316 0:2900 0:00000027 0:8421 1:3806
0:7018 0:0000109 0:6316 0:2228 0:00000026 0:8421 1:3361
0:7369 0:0000108 0:6316 0:1585 0:00000026 0:8421 1:2936
0:7719 0:0000107 0:6316 0:0971 0:00000026 0:8421 1:2530
0:8070 0:0000106 0:6316 0:0381 0:00000026 0:8421 1:2140
When c = 0:5, the optimal policy is fH = 0. This is the optimal policy for any c in
Region III. Note that all of the above simulations show the same qualitative results for
smaller values of I0L, namely I
0
L = 0:01, I
0
L = 0:001 and I
0
L = 0:0001.
These simulations show a fairly intuitive result, namely that as costs rise, we move from
the optimal treatment of everyone to the optimal treatment of only the L strain. They also
demonstrate an interesting nding, whereby there is a small range of costs for which optimal
policy is dependent on initial prevalence of infection.
4.2 Hamiltonian paths with variable policy
In this section we allow policy to vary in the case where K > 1. We also look at strictly
Hamiltonian paths i.e. those that satisfy the Hamiltonian conditions for optimality. In order
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to check that paths are Hamiltonian paths, costate variables are required. We examine each
initial point studied above and solve for values of the costate variables at these points using
the facts that
H =
@V (IH ; IL)
@IH
;
L =
@V (IH ; IL)
@IL
:
These partial derivatives can be approximated by perturbing the infection levels slightly.
Thus, for initial infection levels I0H and I
0
L,
0H 
V (I0H + ; I
0
L)  V (I0H ; I0L)

; (32)
0L 
V (I0H ; I
0
L + )  V (I0H ; I0L)

; (33)
for small . In these simulations we set  = 0:001. Table 8 depicts the Hamiltonian
conditions required for our two potential policies to be optimal:
Table 8 (Hamiltonian optimality conditions)
Policy Condition
fH = 1; f

L = 1 

H <   c ; L <   c
fH = 0; f

L = 1 

H >   c ; L <   c
In order to test whether our paths are Hamiltonian paths, for each initial infection level
we nd the initial costate variables, 0H and 
0
L, using (32) and (33). We then test whether
either of the two candidate policies satises the Hamiltonian conditions. If one does, we
simulate the path from this initial point, using values for our costate variables to test for
optimal policy at each time increment. This allows policy to vary optimally. We then plot
graphs of the evolution of the policy variables over time along with the state variables IH and
IL. This will allow us to see whether there are any switch points (i.e. changes) in policy, and
at what levels of IH and IL they occur. We also simulate the paths backwards, from the
initial point in the direction away from steady state. This gives us an indication of the path
and any possible switch points before the system reaches IH = I0H ; IL = I
0
L. The backwards
paths are necessarily Hamiltonian paths as long as the Hamiltonian conditions for the forward
paths are satised. This is because the backwards paths are merely a continuation, albeit in
the opposite direction, of the Hamiltonian paths.
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Figure 6: Evolution of system towards xed point. I0H = 0:7719; c = 0:1.
Let us begin with the lowest costs, c = 0:1. Solving for the costate variables and checking
the Hamiltonian conditions shows that there is a Hamiltonian path from each initial point,
with optimal policy (1; 1) along the entire path. There are no switch points. One example
of such a path is depicted in Figure 6. The simulations in this section are carried out with
t = 30. Therefore, the graphs show the infection evolving over approximately 30 days. This
path is simple. It is optimal to treat everyone. The control variables do not change over
time and the system gradually moves towards the xed point, with IH dipping slightly before
converging to the steady state level. Fixing policy is optimal. This is in line with our ndings
from the previous section, where moving to A131 was optimal when c = 0:1.
When the paths are run backwards, four of the ve initial points exhibit a switch point
to the policy (0; 1). One example of such a path is given in Figure 7. Careful interpretation
of this graph is required. It depicts movement away from steady state, so it in e¤ect needs to
be read backwards, from right to left. The switch point implies that if we begin at an initial
infection level further away from our (I0H ; I
0
L) - in particular, before the switch point - then
optimal policy will begin at (0; 1) and switch to (1; 1), remaining at (1; 1) until convergence.
Further simulations are carried out on paths when c = 0:295. Each of our ve initial
points has a Hamiltonian path. All paths have one switch point. Simulations show that all
paths converge to xed point A131, somewhat unexpectedly as, for all, initial optimal policy
is (0; 1). These details are shown in Table 9. It is interesting to compare this to the results
of the previous section. We nd that only treating the L strain is initially optimal, but early
on there is an optimal switch to the policy of treating everyone The system never optimally
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Figure 7: Evolution of system away from xed point. I0H = 0:7719; c = 0:1.
converges to A031 in contrast to the case of xed policy. Policy is dependent on initial values,
but not in the same way that we observed in the previous section.
Table 9 (Switch points for Hamiltonian paths when c = 0:295)
I0H Initial (f

H ; f

L) f

H f

L IH at switch IL at switch I

H
0:6667 (0; 1) 0! 1 None 0:7401 0:0734 0:6316
0:7018 (0; 1) 0! 1 None 0:7482 0:0728 0:6316
0:7369 (0; 1) 0! 1 None 0:7558 0:0722 0:6316
0:7719 (0; 1) 0! 1 None 0:7626 0:0717 0:6316
0:8070 (0; 1) 0! 1 None 0:7692 0:0714 0:6316
An example of one of these paths is depicted in Figure 8. The behaviour is di¤erent to
what we observed in Figure 6. There is a switch point early on, after which optimal policy
is to treat everyone. Prior to the switch point, prevalence of the H strand rises. It then
undershoots, growing slightly to converge to the low prevalence steady state. The intuition
behind the switch point is that initially, prevalence of the H strand is not high enough to
justify full treatment - the marginal cost of an additional infected person is lower than the
relative cost of treatment. As IH rises, there comes a point when this marginal cost exceeds
the relative cost of treatment. At this point, policy switches to treating everyone.
When running the path backwards, there is again one switch point. This is shown in
Figure 9. Reading the graph from right to left, it is clear that optimal policy begins with
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Figure 8: Evolution of system towards xed point. I0H = 0:7369; c = 0:295.
treating no one, with fL switching to full treatment as we approach IH = 0:7369. Thereafter,
the path follows what is depicted in Figure 8.
Next, we turn to the example of high costs, when c = 0:5. Only three of our ve initial
points have a Hamiltonian path. Despite each path beginning with only treating the L strain,
similar to our results in the previous section with non-variable policy, all three paths switch
to the policy of full treatment after a short period and converge to the xed point with lower
infection level. Thus, the paths we derived in the previous section when c = 0:5 were not
Hamiltonian along their entirety. The details of the switch points when c = 0:5 are given in
the table below:
Table 10 (Switch points for Hamiltonian paths when c = 0:5)
I0H Initial (f

H ; f

L) f

H f

L IH at switch IL at switch I

H
0:6667 (0; 1) 0! 1 None 0:7608 0:0619 0:6316
0:7018 (0; 1) 0! 1 None 0:7641 0:0617 0:6316
0:7369 (0; 1) 0! 1 None 0:7672 0:0615 0:6316
Figure 10 depicts an example of such a path. The behaviour of the system is similar to
the case when c = 0:295. There is a sharper rise in IH than in the previous example, but
the system still converges to A131 after the policy switch. The path approaching I
0
H is shown
in Figure 11. When approaching the xed point, optimal policy does not treat anyone for a
large segment of the path. There is a policy switch very close to I0H . This is similar to the
behaviour observed at low costs, c = 0:1, and in contrast to the behaviour observed when
c = 0:295. This is likely to be because c = 0:295 is within the range of costs where optimal
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Figure 9: Evolution of system away from xed point. I0H = 0:7369; c = 0:295.
Figure 10: Evolution of system towards xed point. I0H = 0:7369; c = 0:5.
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Figure 11: Evolution of system away from xed point. I0H = 0:7369; c = 0:5.
policy is not clear and instead depends on prevalence levels. Thus, we expect to observe more
policy switches in this intermediate case than we observe at the extreme cases.
There are several points to take away from these simulations. First, when policy is
variable, all simulations converge to the xed point A131. This is interesting because, despite
the policy of only treating the L strain being optimal on segments of some of the paths, it is
still optimal to converge to the low infection state. Thus, the simulations suggest that it is
always better to attempt to lower prevalence of the H strand as much as possible. Another
observation to note is that when costs are su¢ ciently low, our paths are simple, with no
switch points. They retain the same optimal policy that they began with, namely treating
everyone. Fixed policy is optimal at low cost levels. As costs rise, the paths become more
complex. We observe switch points and the policymaker is better o¤ if she has exibility in
her actions. This is relevant in particular for the paths modelled moving away from the xed
point. Here, the extreme examples of c = 0:1 and c = 0:5 exhibit simple paths with only one
policy switch. In contrast, the paths when c = 0:295 are complex. This provides evidence
for the intuitive idea that when costs are extremely low or extremely high, optimal policy is
likely to be simple to predict. When costs are somewhere in the intermediate range, optimal
policy is likely to be complex and change frequently over the course of the epidemic.
The examples in this section pointed towards A131 as the sole optimal xed point. We
ask ourselves whether there are any parameters such that it is optimal to move to or remain
at xed point A031, where I

H is higher than at A
1
31. This question is addressed in the next
section.
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4.3 The Skiba curve
In this section we address the case when K  1. In this scenario, it is possible to have steady
states where both strains of the disease prevail. Section 3.3.2 hypothesised the existence of a
Skiba curve between the two lines of interior xed point. This hypothesis is explored in this
section. We set H = 0:6 in order to ensure that K < 1. Note that K = 1 is a simplied
case of K < 1 with no Skiba curve, so K < 1 is the more interesting case to simulate. All
other parameters are the same as in the previous section, apart from costs which are set to
c = 0:6. We run paths between the two lines of xed points and look for initial values (I0H ; I
0
L)
where the values of the integral of taking the path towards A12 versus A20 are equal. We
take several paths starting at A12 and looking for the Skiba point along each of those paths.
We then use these Skiba points to infer the Skiba curve.
The value of total infection and optimal policy at each line of xed points is given in the
table below:
Table 11 (Characteristics of interior xed points)
Fixed point I = IH + IL fH f

L
A12 1  +H = 0:4167 1 1 
(H L)
H
+
 = 0:416
A20 1  L = 0:6250
(H L)
L

 = 0:375 0
We split the total value of infection at A12, which we will refer to as I12, into twenty
equal segments. This gives us twenty initial points (I0H ; I
0
L)i; i = 1; :::; 20. We run the path
from these points towards A20. In each of these cases it is better to stay at A12 than to
move towards A20. However, it is also better to stay at A20 than to move towards A12.
This suggests that there is a point of indi¤erence along each path where moving towards A12
versus A20 leaves the policymaker indi¤erent. We take several points along each path and
examine the value of the integral of going forward towards A20 or back towards A12. We
record the (I0H ; I
0
L) where V (go to A20) = V (go to A12). In addition, we explore in further
detail initial values where the point of indi¤erence is likely to lie on one of the xed point
line. Put simply, these are the two points where the Skiba line intersects each xed point
line. Exploring these points with greater precision allows a more accurate Skiba line to be
plotted. This is shown in Figure (12).
It is clear that the Skiba curve exists, which conrms our hypothesis. However, it is not
a straight line and it intersects each of the xed point lines. It is also of a slightly steeper
slope than the two lines of xed points. This is because of the higher infectivity of the H
strain. When I0H is high and I
0
L is low, we reach A20 faster than when I
0
H is low and I
0
L is
high. Similarly, when I0H is low and I
0
L is high, we reach A12 faster than when I
0
H is high and
I0L is low. We are more likely to observe indi¤erence closer to A20 when I
0
H is high and closer
to A12 when I0H is low.
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Figure 12: The estimated Skiba curve.
We also hypothesise that the Skiba line continues beyond the points where it intersects
the xed point lines. Specically, the two paths that begin at the points of intersection with
the xed point lines and move away from each of these lines are assumed to represent the
continuation of the Skiba line. We call this continuation, combined with the estimated Skiba
points, the extendedSkiba line. The extended Skiba line in fact delineates two areas. Above
the extended Skiba line, it is always optimal to go to A20, even if this involves crossing xed
point line A12. Below the line, it is always optimal to go to A12, even if this involves crossing
A20. It is optimal to go to the xed point that is further away.
These results show that when costs are high but K < 1, we can reach the interior xed
points. There exists a curve of indi¤erence between the two lines where moving towards the
xed point with higher total prevalence is just as valuable as moving towards the xed point
with lower total prevalence. Further, there are areas where although it is faster to reach one
xed point, it is optimal to take the longer path towards the other xed point. These areas
are shown by the Skiba continuation lines. The Skiba curve provides a delineation of two
areas, each of which have a clear optimal policy. This is useful: a policymaker tackling any
initial infection level that lies in one of these two areas immediately knows the optimal policy
for the situation at hand.
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4.4 Optimal policy lessons from the simulations
Three sets of simulations were carried out. Each taught us di¤erent lessons about optimal
policy. First, simulations were carried out with xed policy, where both infection strains
were initially prevalent at a positive level. In this case, treating everyone and converging
to a lower prevalence of the H strain was optimal with low costs. As costs rose, optimal
policy was ambiguous and began to depend on the initial prevalence level. The further away
we started from A131, the more likely it was that converging to A
0
31 would be optimal. As
costs rose further, optimal policy unambiguously pointed towards not treating anyone and
allowing the system to converge to the xed point with higher prevalence of H. From this
set of simulations we learn that when policy needs to be xed, optimal policy is denitely
dependent on costs and may also be dependent on initial prevalence levels.
The second set of simulations allowed policy to vary. Here we observed that regardless of
the costs and the initial prevalence level, the system always optimally instructed us to treat
everyone when close to steady state. It was never optimal to allow the H strain to prevail
at the higher level. However, the policy almost always exhibited switch points, the exception
being the case when c = 0:1. Let us consider the intuition behind switch points. In most
cases optimal policy began with treating only the L strain, switching to full treatment when
the system was closer to equilibrium. This suggests that as long as policy can vary, we can
reach A131 without needing to set fH = 1 throughout. In fact, as long as we are allowed some
periods where the IH types are not treated, it is always optimal to, eventually, bring them
down to a low prevalence level. Thus: as long as we have exibility in the policy instrument,
we can always reach A131. This is true for intermediate and high costs. The reason why this
is not the case with high costs and xed policy is because treating everyone for the whole
duration of the epidemic proves to be too expensive to be worth it. Some interesting lessons
were observed from the backwards simulations as well, which simply reinforce the idea that
exibility often induces switch points which allow us to reach betterequilibria.
The third set of simulations focused on the Skiba line. It was shown that the Skiba
hypothesis is valid: there exists a line of indi¤erence that lies between the two lines of xed
points. There is a further continuation of the Skiba line beyond the two lines of xed points,
which helps delineate two areas that determine which xed point is optimal. In general, the
higher the total infection level I0H + I
0
L, the more likely it is that movement to A20 is optimal.
This is intuitive: if the infection is very prevalent, it is more costly to move to the xed point
with lower total infection. For a given total initial infection level, the higher the proportion
of I0H in the total, the more likely it is that xed point A20 is optimal. This is because
the H strain is more di¢ cult to treat due to its higher infectivity. Similarly the higher the
proportion of I0L in the total, the more likely it is that xed point A12 is optimal. Thus, we
learn that when we are in the interior region of initial infection levels, two factors determine
which policy is optimal: the total initial infection level and its composition of H and L types.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has explored an SIS model with two variants of infection di¤erentiated by trans-
mission risk. It has been shown that there are two types of steady states. First, there is a set
of xed points with one treatment level at the boundary and one at an interior level. These
xed points form two lines in (IH ; IL) space and are only feasible under certain parameter
combinations. Only the total level of infection is pinned down here; the distribution of this
total infection between the two strains will depend on initial levels. Optimal policy for these
steady states is derived; along the path, optimal policy is always at a boundary, after which
it may switch to an interior level when steady state is reached. There are also asymptotic
xed points that involve asymptotic eradication of one strand, while the other strand remains
endemic. Under the same parameter combinations that eliminate the interior xed points, we
are left only with those asymptotic xed points that asymptotically eradicate the L strand,
leaving the H strand to prevail. This is interesting as it suggests that sometimes it may be
optimal for the policymaker to focus treatment on the less infective strand, which may seem
counterintuitive. It is also shown that simultaneous asymptotic eradication of both strands
is not possible.
Simulations focus on two cases: when only asymptotic eradication of the L strand is
feasible, and when the interior xed points are feasible. In the rst case, we consider two
situations: when policy is xed throughout the epidemic and when policy is exible. We vary
costs and compare policy across di¤erent parameter combinations. The results are insightful.
When policy is xed, there is a clear relationship between costs and optimal policy. There is
a small intermediate range of costs where optimal policy is dependent on initial value. This
range contains a Skiba point. When policy is allowed to vary, all paths converge to the steady
state with full treatment, even at high costs. At low costs, optimal policy is xed and there
is no added benet from being able to vary policy. As costs rise, policy exhibits switch points
and there is additional benet from variable policy. In the second case the interior xed
points are feasible and simulations show the Skiba line. The total initial infection level and
the proportion of H versus L types determine whether the policymaker should move towards
A20 or A12 or whether he is indi¤erent between the two.
There are several points to take away from these results. There are many possible steady
states, and feasibility will depend on paremeters. Simulations show that in the case of a
reduced set of feasible steady states, optimal xed policy is clearly related to cost of treatment.
The non-equality of optimal xed policy and optimal variable policy in most cases suggests
that there is an added benet from policy exibility. Therefore, our policy recommendation
is that treatment agencies should negotiate exible terms with their suppliers and their
governments so that they have the option to change policy over time.
Further research should consider extending the simulations to look at other parameter
combinations. It would also be interesting to extend this model to include protection via
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vaccination as another instrument available to the policymaker.
A Analysis of interior xed points
A.1 Fixed point A12
At xed point A12, we can characterise the total level of infection:
IH + I

L = 1 
 + 
H
:
Further, the equation of motion for H is given by
_H = 0
= p+ cfH + 

H   H
 
_IH
IH
!
+ (HHI

H + 

LLI

L)
= p+ cfH + 

H + (

HHI

H + 

LLI

L):
where the second equality follows from the fact that _IH = 0 at a steady state. Similarly,
_L = 0
= p+ cfL + 

L   L
 
_IL
IL
!
+ (HHI

H + 

LLI

L)
= p+ cfL + 

L + (

HHI

H + 

LLI

L):
By subtraction,
c(fH   fL) + (H   L) = 0:
Since fL is interior, it must be that 

L =   c . Thus,
H =  
c


1 +
(H   L)
H
 + 


:
Since H   L > 0; it follows that H <   c , as required by the Hamiltonian conditions.
Thus, there is a line of xed points in (IH ; IL) space of type A12 that satises the Hamiltonian
conditions with the following properties:
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IH + I

L = 1 
 + 
H
H =  
c


1 +
(H   L)
H
 + 


<   c

L =  
c

fH = 1
fL = 1 
(H   L)
H
 + 

A.2 Fixed point A20
Rearranging _IH = 0 and _IL = 0 gives us the total level of infection,
IH + I

L = 1 

L
:
The equations of motion for the costate variables are,
_H = 0
= p+ cfH + 

H   H
 
_IH
IH
!
+ (H HI

H + 

L LI

L )
= p+ cfH + 

H + (

H HI

H + 

L LI

L );
_L = 0
= p+ cfL + 

L   L
 
_IL
IL
!
+ (H HI

H + 

L LI

L )
= p+ cfL + 

L + (

H HI

H + 

L LI

L ):
Employing the same method as in the previous section, we subtract to yield
c(fH   fL ) + (H   L ) = 0:
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Since fH is interior it must be that 

H =   c . Thus,
L =  
c


1  (H   L)
L



:
Since H   L > 0 it follows that L >   c always holds, as required by the Hamiltonian
conditions. Thus, there is a line of xed points of type A20 that satisfy the Hamiltonian
conditions with the following properties:
IH + I

L = 1 

L
H =  
c

L =  
c


1  (H   L)
L



>   c

fH =
(H   L)
L


fL = 0
B Asymptotic eradication
Proposition 10 Both variants of the disease cannot be simultaneously eradicated even as-
ymptotically in equilibrium, i.e. we cannot have both IH ! 0 and IL ! 0, if we assume that
 + 
H
< 1;

L
< 1;
 + 
L
< 1:
Proof. To see this, rst consider the case of the interior xed points. Here, it is trivial. In
the case of A12, IH + I

L = 1   +H . We cannot have I

H + I

L = 0. Similarly for A20 where
IH + I

L = 1  L , it is not possible to have I

H + I

L = 0. Next, consider the asymptotic xed
points. In the case of A31, we know that IL ! 0 so the question is what happens to IH . For
IL to tend towards zero asymptotically, the necessary condition is IH > 1   +L . Clearly
IH 6= 0 is necessary for this to be satised. Similarly, xed point A13 implies that IH ! 0.
The necessary condition for this is IL > 1  +H , which can only be satised if IL 6= 0: Thus,
both variants of the disease cannot be eradicated in equilibrium, even asymptotically.
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C Regimes of feasibility
Proposition 11 If K < 1, there exist a line of xed points of type A12 and a line of xed
points of type A20. If K = 1, there exists a xed point of type A10. If K > 1, there are no
ordinary xed points.
Proof. The conditions for the two kinds of interior xed points to exist are as follows:
A12 : fH = 1; fL 2 (0; 1) needs 1 > (H   L)
H
 + 

A20 : fH 2 (0; 1); fL = 0 needs 1 > (H   L)
L


These two conditions are, in fact, identical. To see this, consider the following rearrange-
ment of the condition for A12:
1 >
(H   L)
H
 + 

, H > (H   L)( + )
, L( + ) > H
, L > (H   L)
, 1 > (H   L)
L


This demonstrates that both conditions are equivalent to L(+) > H . The condition
1 > (H L)L

 is identical to K < 1.
If K = 1, this implies that (H L)L

 =
(H L)
H
+
 = 1, and both A12 and A20 become
the xed point of type A10. Total infection is characterised by the equation:
IH + IL = 1   + 
H
= 1  
L
:
If K > 1, none of the conditions for A12, A20 nor A10 are satised. Therefore there are
no ordinary xed points.
Proposition 12 If K < 1, there exist AFPs of type A031, A
i
31, A
1
31, A
0
13 and A
i
13. If K  1,
there exist AFPs of type A031, A
i
31, and A
1
31.
Proof. First, note that the necessary condition for the feasibility of A31 (
+fH
H
< +L
) is
satised independently of the value of K.
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Next, consider K < 1 and A13. The necessary condition for this AFP to be feasible is
+fL
L
< +H
. This is never satised for fL = 1. However, it may be satised for small
enough fL. In particular, when K < 1, it is satised when f

L = 0. Thus, the AFPs that
are feasible when K < 1 are A031; A
i
31; A
1
31; A
0
13 and A
i
13: Here, A
i
13 is dened such that f

L is
small enough to satisfy the feasibility condition for this AFP.
Next, consider K  1. For A13 to be a feasible equilibrium, we require +H >
+fL
L
,
which is violated for all values of fL when K  1. Thus, the set of AFPs that are feasible
when K  1 is A031; Ai31 and A131.
D Feasible policy along the path
In order to derive which policies are feasible along the path towards steady state, it is nec-
essary to examine each MRAP policy in turn and derive the conditions that are required for
IH and IL to converge.
First, consider P00. This policy implies
_IH
IH
= H(1  IH   IL)   ;
_IL
IL
= L(1  IH   IL)   :
There are two ways of approaching a xed point with this policy. First, we can have
_IH ; _IL > 0 (i.e. IH and IL are increasing towards IH and I

L). The required conditions for
this are
1  
L
> IH + IL
1  
H
> IH + IL
which collapse to
1  
L
> IH + IL:
Similarly, we can have _IH ; _IL < 0 (i.e. IH and IL are decreasing towards IH and I

L). The
required conditions for this are
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1  
L
< IH + IL
1  
H
< IH + IL
which collapse to
1  
H
< IH + IL:
Next, consider P10. For _IH ; _IL > 0, the required conditions are
1  
L
> IH + IL
1   + 
H
> IH + IL
where the overriding condition is
1  
L
> IH + IL:
For _IH ; _IL < 0, we require
1  
L
< IH + IL
1   + 
H
< IH + IL
both of which are satised when
1   + 
H
< IH + IL:
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Third, take P11. For _IH ; _IL > 0, we need to satisfy
1   + 
H
> IH + IL
1   + 
L
> IH + IL
where the overriding condition is
1   + 
L
> IH + IL:
For _IH ; _IL < 0, we require
1   + 
H
< IH + IL
1   + 
L
< IH + IL
both of which are satised when
1   + 
H
< IH + IL:
Last, consider P01. For _IH ; _IL > 0, we need to satisfy
1  
H
> IH + IL
1   + 
L
> IH + IL
where the overriding condition is
1   + 
L
> IH + IL:
For _IH ; _IL < 0, we require
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1  
H
< IH + IL
1   + 
L
< IH + IL
both of which are satised when
1  
H
< IH + IL:
E Optimal policy in the region of the IFPs
Proposition 13 The optimal policy when approaching A12 from above is fL = 1. The
optimal policy when approaching this xed point from below is fL = 0. The optimal value of
fH is equal to its steady state value, f

H = 1, throughout. For xed point A20, the optimal
policy when approaching from above is fH = 1 and f

H = 0 when approaching from below.
The optimal value of fL is at its steady state value, f

L = 0.
Proof. First, take A12. Let us perturb the solution by changing fL from fL to f

L + fL
whilst leaving fH unchanged at its steady state value. Immediately following this change,
_IH = 0; _IL =  ILfL 6= 0; _H = 0 and _L = 0: Di¤erentiating (20) yields
L = (c+ 

L)
_fL   _L (  + L(1  IL   IH)     fL) + LL( _IH + _IL)
+( _HHI

H +
_LLI

L) + (

HH
_IH + 

LL
_IL)
= 2LL _IL
=  2 c

L( IL)fL
= 2cLI

LfL 6= 0
Thus, there is a policy switch. To see this, consider the following. If fL > 0 then L > 0
and _IL < 0. Since we require L =   c at the xed point, this implies that L <   c when
approaching the xed point from above. The Hamiltonian conditions imply that fL = 1 along
this segment of the path. Likewise, if fL < 0 then L < 0 and _IL > 0. This implies that
L >   c when approaching the xed point from below, and hence from the Hamiltonian
conditions it must be that fL = 0. Since _H = 0 and H <   c at the xed point, it must
be that H <   c holds on either side of the xed point, by continuity. This demonstrates
that there is a Hamiltonian path to A12 which involves boundary values of fH and fL until
it reaches the xed point, when it switches to an interior value of fL. There is no change in
fH .
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Next, take A20. Perturb the solution by altering fH from fH to f

H + fH , leaving
fL = 0: Immediately following this change, _IH =  IH fH 6= 0, _IL = 0, _H = 0 and
_L = 0. Di¤erentiating _H we see that in the proximity to this xed point,
H = (c+ 

H )
_fH   _H (  + H(1  IH   IL )     fH ) + H H( _IH + _IL)
+( _HHI

H +
_LLI

L ) + (

H H _IH + 

L L _IL)
= 2H H _IH
=  2 c

H( IH )fH
= 2cHI

H fH 6= 0
Again, there will be a policy switch. If fH > 0 then H > 0 and _IH < 0. This implies
that H <   c when approaching the xed point from above, and hence from the Hamiltonian
conditions it must be that fH = 1. Likewise, if fH < 0 then H < 0 and _IH > 0. This
implies that H >   c when approaching the xed point from below, and hence it must be
the case that fH = 0. By continuity, L >   c and fL = 0 on both sides of the xed point.
Thus, there is a Hamiltonian path to this xed point which involves boundary values of fH
and fL and a switch to an interior value of fH on reaching the xed point, while retaining
the boundary value for fL.
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